The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we are interested in assessing the validity of one version of Kim’s argument against genuine higher level causation. Second, we discuss Wilson’s proposal to consider a weaker notion of emergence as genuinely metaphysical and compatible with Non-Reductive Physicalism. Our conclusion is that both proposals fail: the first in preempting genuine (strong) emergent causation, whereas the second in ensuring a genuinely metaphysical status to weak emergence. After all, Wilson’s proposal strongly depends on (...) the success of Kim’s, not only because it takes it as valid but, also, because in pursuing its own weaker model it shares the presuppositions that led Kim’s to failure. At the end of the day, Wilson’s conception of genuine weak emergence either breaks causal closure or is merely stipulative, namely confined at the descriptive level. (shrink)

Nominalism in formal ontology is still the thesis that the only acceptable domain of quantification is the first-order domain of particulars. Nominalists may assert that second-order well-formed formulas can be fully and completely interpreted within the first-order domain, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to second-order entities, by means of an appropriate semantics called “substitutional”. In this paper I argue that the success of this strategy depends on the ability of Nominalists to maintain that identity, and equivalence relations more in general, (...) is first-order and invariant. Firstly, I explain why Nominalists are formally bound to this first-order concept of identity. Secondly, I show that the resources needed to justify identity, a certain conception of identity invariance, are out of the Nominalist’s reach. (shrink)

The paper discusses some formal difficulties concerning the theory of universals of Trope-Only ontologies, from which the formal theory of predication advanced by Trope-Only theorists seems to be irremediably affected. It is impossible to lay out a successful defense of a Trope-Only theory without Russellian types, but such types are ontologically inconsistent with tropes’ nominalism. Historically, Tropists’ first way to avoid the problem is appealing to the supervenience claim, which however fails on its terms and, thus, fails as a ground (...) for a solution to the higher-order or ‘type’ problem. A later solution involves the invariance of primitive equivalence relations in order to make universals ontologically innocuous. However, I argue that this latter solution fails to meet the requirements imposed on an ontologically unbiased nominalist attitude. So, this paper discusses how Trope-Only theories alter standard formal moves in Nominalism, and also is interested in clarifying further the formal assumptions for these problems. (shrink)

The present paper argues that substantialist metaphysics are in tension with the physicalist idea that the universe is causally closed. The argument is a rather specific one and proceeds through three steps. The first step consists in arguing that monistic substance metaphysics allow for the existence of entities that cannot belong to the intended first order domain. This result sensitively depends on the nature of substances as invariant entities. The second step concludes that, if further domains are to be admitted, (...) then they are inhabited by “higher” or (systematically) “non-standard” entities and that, in both cases if not made somehow innocuous, such entities may take part on the metaphysical construction of the world through their own distinctive properties and causal powers. However, this latter claim is in contradiction with causal closure. But closure is the principle that mainly characterizes physicalist approaches in metaphysics and as such physicalist metaphysics cannot get rid of it. Who attempted making exotic properties and causal powers innocuous usually appealed to the Supervenience Argument. Unfortunately, as the third step proves, this argument is invalid. Finally, the paper looks forward and toward alternative models for physicalist metaphysics, like process-based models. (shrink)

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) asserts that if putative objects x and y share all properties P, then they must be one and the same entity. Since the usual formal rendering of the PII has the same formal structure as the Leibniz Identity, it may be unclear whether it can be used to define identity and objectuality. As identity and objectuality are closely related, this study aims to examine their relationship within the framework of formal ontology. Crucial (...) for the discussion are issues about type and range of quantification and the invariance of the identity predicate coourring in the PII. Ultimately, the analysis reveals that the appeal to PII is insufficient for providing both identity and objectuality. Some further considerations about how the PII sensitively constrains the range of available ontologies or metaphysics are formulated. (shrink)

Kim’s Ontological Physicalism (OP) presents itself as a naturalistic and monistic metaphysical framework, aligned with the causal closure of the universe and rejecting causally efficacious “exotic” properties. The foundational ontology is, in turn, monistic and materialistic, positing that the universe is composed solely of material particulars: bits of matter. In this work, we identify a notable tension between OP’s intended model and the one OP specifies. Initially, we show how the theory inevitably becomes entangled with higher-order entities, not just particulars. (...) Kim introduces the Supervenience Argument (SA) to counteract the possibility of higher-order entities being causally efficacious. While SA proves to be a plausible strategy, it is ultimately inadequate: not only SA is a petitio principii against emergence, but it is also unsound and invalid. Therefore, we propose a formal strategy to restore its ontological effectiveness. Unfortunately, at a closer look, even this strategy falls short as it unwarrantedly assumes the logicality and invariance of those equivalence relations (such as identity, similarity, and congruence) which are crucial for specifying the theory’s model as composed of particulars. (shrink)

The main aim of this work is to evaluate whether Boolos’ semantics for second-order languages is model-theoretically equivalent to standard model-theoretic semantics. Such an equivalence result is, actually, directly proved in the “Appendix”. I argue that Boolos’ intent in developing such a semantics is not to avoid set-theoretic notions in favor of pluralities. It is, rather, to prevent that predicates, in the sense of functions, refer to classes of classes. Boolos’ formal semantics differs from a semantics of pluralities for Boolos’ (...) plural reading of second-order quantifiers, for the notion of plurality is much more general, not only of that set, but also of class. In fact, by showing that a plurality is equivalent to sub-sets of a power set, the notion of plurality comes to suffer a loss of generality. Despite of this equivalence result, I maintain that Boolos’ formal semantics does not committ second-order languages to second-order entities, contrary to standard semantics. Further, such an equivalence result provides a rationale for many criticisms to Boolos’ formal semantics, in particular those by Resnik and Parsons against its alleged ontological innocence and on its Platonistic presupposition. The key set-theoretic notion involved in the equivalence proof is that of many-valued function. But, first, I will provide a clarification of the philosophical context and theoretical grounds of the genesis of Boolos’ formal semantics. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to argue for the idea that processes and process-based entities are to be modelled as relational structures. Relational structures are genuine structures, namely entities not committed to the existence of basic objects. My argument moves from the analysis of Whitehead’s original insight about process-based entities that, despite some residual of substance metaphysics, has the merit of grounding the intrinsic dynamism of reality on the holistic and relational characters of process-based entities. The current model of (...) process ontology requires genuine emergence and this, in turn, requires organizations, i.e., emergence in organizations. Another view about processes rely on a structural specification of processes. I suggest that the two views can be made compatible by the help of a specific sort of structures, namely relational structures. The appeal to the mathematical theory of genuine structures, category theory, reveals the formal plausibility of this convergence. According to this formal approach, genuine structures are essentially dynamic entities for they are relational, namely, as well as organizations, they are not existentially committed to particulars. (shrink)

The discovery of mirror neurons caused a revolution in neuroscience and psychology. Nevertheless, because of their profound impact within life sciences, mirror neuron are still the subject of numerous debates concerning their origins and their functions. With more than 20 years of research in this area, it is timely to synthesise the expanding literature on this topic. 'New frontiers in Mirror Neurons' provides a comprehensive overview of the latest advances in mirror neurons research - accessible both to experts and to (...) non-experts. In the book, leading scholars draw on the latest research to examine methodological approaches, theoretical implications, and the latest findings on mirror neurons research. (shrink)

È possibile istituire un nesso tra la presenza di Dio nel mondo, che Buber avrebbe descritto fin dai suoi primi scritti chassidici attraverso la nozione cabalistica di Shekinah, la presenza di Dio nell'uomo e la presenza dell’uomo a se stesso? È possibile riconoscere alla presenza il carattere fondamentale dell’accadere della relazione e, insieme, fondare la religione sull'accadere di quell’originario evento d’incontro, su una risposta al Tu? È possibile che, proprio attraverso l’evento della presenza, del presente dischiuso nell’Augenblick, la religione possa (...) ritornare al suo significato di relazione, di legame vissuto nella pienezza dell’ora terrena? Ultima delle Sefirot a rompersi nella dottrina di I. Luria, la presenza di Dio nel mondo si offre all’uomo capace di riceverla, nell’in-tra-tenersi della relazione, sul fondamento di una passività originaria, in cui l’uomo è chiamato a rispondere con un’azione che proviene dall’interezza del proprio essere. Relazione entro l’essere del singolo uomo, chiamato a compiere in se stesso quell’interezza che ha nome unità; relazione tra il singolo uomo e l’intero cosmo, a partire da ogni singolo “altro” che gli può accadere di incontrare; relazione come incontro, unità, rivelazione, religione e, pertanto, come presenza. Religione come presenza, parimenti nell’urgere dell'eterno nell’istante, nel “qui e ora” della ewige Offenbarung. “In principio è la relazione” - tale è l’intuizione buberiana fondamentale, a partire dalla quale la realtà può raggiungere il proprio compimento come quel dialogo in cui incontrante e incontrato si chiamano tra loro Io e Tu, nel dono reciproco della presenza. Presenza e relazione, sistole e diastole dell’unica vita reale. (shrink)

Solcando il mare aperto dell’Europa all’alba del Ventesimo secolo, il giovane Martin Buber (1878-1965) ha sopra di sé diverse costellazioni, offerte tanto dal filosofare di Nietzsche, Dilthey e Simmel, quanto dalla letteratura della Jung Wien, quanto ancora da un ebraismo personale e sotterraneo, oscillante tra sionismo culturale e chassidismo. L’antitesi tra religione e religiosità offre a lui – come a noi – il sestante con il quale orientarsi in una così ardua navigazione. Forte di ciò, Buber veleggia in direzione dei (...) lidi, talora ascosi, della mistica, approdando a Cusano e a Böhme, a Laozi e al Baal Schem. La pluralità delle vie, da lui attraversate in questa stagione della sua vita e del suo pensiero, è fedelmente ripercorsa nella presente monografia, in cui il giovane Buber assurge a paradigmatico testimone della simbiosi ebraicotedesca d’inizio Novecento e della sua irripetibile Stimmung. (shrink)

It is now generally accepted that the motor system is not purely dedicated to the control of behavior, but also has cognitive functions. Mirror neurons have provided a new perspective on how sensory information regarding others’ actions and gestures is coupled with the internal cortical motor representation of them. This coupling allows an individual to enrich his interpretation of the social world through the activation of his own motor representations. Such mechanisms have been highly preserved in evolution as they are (...) present in humans, apes and monkeys. Recent neuroanatomical data showed that there are two different connectivity patterns in mirror neuron networks in the macaque: one is concerned with sensorimotor transformation in relation to reaching and hand grasping within the traditional parietal-premotor circuits; the second one is linked to the mouth/face motor control and the new data show that it is connected with limbic structures. The mouth mirror sector seems to be wired not only for ingestive behaviors but also for orofacial communicative gestures and vocalizations. Notably, the hand and mouth mirror networks partially overlap, suggesting the importance of hand-mouth synergies not only for sensorimotor transformation, but also for communicative purposes in order to better convey and control social signals. (shrink)

In the current opinion paper, we provide a comparative perspective on specific aspects of primate empathic abilities, with particular emphasis on the mirror neuron system associated with mouth/face actions and expression. Mouth and faces can be very salient communicative classes of stimuli that allow an observer access to the emotional and physiological content of other individuals. We thus describe patterns of activations of neural populations related to observation and execution of specific mouth actions and emotional facial expressions in some species (...) of monkeys and in humans. Particular attention is given to dynamics of face-to-face interactions in the early phases of development and to the differences in the anatomy of facial muscles among different species of primates. We hypothesize that increased complexity in social environments and patterns of social development have promoted specializations of facial musculature, behavioral repertoires related to production and recognition of facial emotional expression, and their neural correlates. In several primates, mirror circuits involving parietal-frontal regions, insular regions, cingulate cortices, and amygdala seem to support automatic forms of embodied empathy, which probably contribute to facial mimicry and behavioural synchrony. In humans these circuits interact with specific prefrontal and temporo-parietal cortical regions, which facilitates higher order cognitive functions such as cognitive empathy and mental state attribution. Our analysis thus suggests that the evolution of higher forms of empathy, such as mentalizing, is also linked to the coupling between the perceptual and motor system related to face processing, which may have undergone a process of exaptation during primate phylogeny. (shrink)

Empathy is the phenomenal experience of mirroring ourselves into others. It can be explained in terms of simulations of actions, sensations, and emotions which constitute a shared manifold for intersubjectivity. Simulation, in turn, can be sustained at the subpersonal level by a series of neural mirror matching systems.

Different theories have been proposed for explaining the evolution of language. One of this maintains that gestural communication has been the precursor of human speech. Here we present a series of neurophysiological evidences that support this hypothesis. Communication by gestures, defined as the capacity to emit and recognize meaningful actions, may have originated in the monkey motor cortex from a neural system whose basic function was action understanding. This system is made by neurons of monkey’s area F5, named mirror neurons, (...) activated by both execution and observation of goal-related actions. Recently, two new categories of mirror neurons have been described. Neurons of one category respond to the sound of an action, neurons of the other category respond to the observation of mouth ingestive and communicative actions. The properties of these neurons indicate that monkey’s area F5 possesses the basic neural mechanisms for associating gestures and meaningful sounds as a pre-adaptation for the later emergence of articulated speech. The homology and the functional similarities between monkey area F5 and Broca’s area support this evolutionary scenario. (shrink)

Songbirds possess mirror neurons (MNs) activating during the perception and execution of specific features of songs. These neurons are located in high vocal center (HVC), a premotor nucleus implicated in song perception, production and learning, making worth to inquire their properties and functions in vocal recognition and imitative learning. By integrating a body of brain and behavioral data, we discuss neurophysiology, anatomical, computational properties and possible functions of songbird MNs. -/- We state that the neurophysiological properties of songbird MNs depends (...) on sensorimotor regions that are outside the auditory neural system. Interestingly, songbirds MNs can be the result of the specific type of song representation possessed by some songbird species. At the functional level, we discuss whether songbird MNs are involved in others' song recognition, by dissecting the function of recognition in various different but possible overlapping processes: action-oriented perception, discriminative-oriented perception and identification of the signaler. We conclude that songbird MNs may be involved in recognizing other singer's vocalizations, while their role in imitative learning still require to solve how auditory feedback are used to correct own vocal performance to match the tutor song. Finally, we compare songbird and human mirror responses, hypothesizing a case of convergent evolution, and proposing new experimental directions. (shrink)